Justice Simonett\u27s Constitutional Wisdom by Lansing, Harriet
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 3 Article 8
2013
Justice Simonett's Constitutional Wisdom
Harriet Lansing
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation





JUSTICE SIMONETT’S CONSTITUTIONAL WISDOM 
Honorable Harriet Lansing†  
Justice Simonett brought the power of his intellect, his 
experience, and his emblematic writing style to bear on 
constitutional issues in the same way that he brought these powers 
to all of his inspired analysis and reflection on appellate cases and 
legal doctrines. 
His wide-ranging skills and talents defy easy description.  But 
the comments of lawyers and colleagues and the words that spill 
over two hundred entries in a Westlaw “All Law Reviews, Texts & 
Bar Journals” search1 provide some insight into his talent and 
character: a legacy of high wit and deep wisdom, a man of letters, 
an extraordinary gift for the written and spoken word, a man of 
uncommon decency and dignity, a man who made us all proud to 
be lawyers and judges, a man of uncommon common sense, a 
judge committed to getting the law straight and making it work, a 
judge who understood the whole legal structure and its effects on 
people, a judge wise in the ways of people, a judge who understood 
motives, a thoughtful and unfailingly courteous colleague, a highly 
literate and graceful writer, a judge who used powerful analogies, a 




       †     Judge, Minnesota Court of Appeals, 1983–2011; Senior Judge, 2011–
present.  Uniform Law Commission, Executive Committee Chair (President-elect), 
2012–present.  B.A., 1967, Macalester College; J.D., 1970, University of Minnesota 
Law School.  When I was sworn in as a judge on the Minnesota Court of Appeals in 
1983, John Simonett had been on the Minnesota Supreme Court for three years 
and continued to serve for another eleven years.  Over those years of concurrent 
appellate service and beyond, I have been deeply grateful, not only for John 
Simonett’s sterling example and his kind friendship, but also for lighting many a 
Friday afternoon with the release of his remarkable opinions that read with the 
ease of literature and applied with the precision of carefully drafted architecture. 
 1.  A search of “Simonett” in Westlaw’s “All Law Reviews, Texts & Bar 
Journals” database yields 217 responses, seventeen of which refer to John’s 
daughters, Judge Anne V. Simonett and Judge Martha M. Simonett.  The 
remaining two hundred items relate to John. 
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Others described him in no less laudatory terms but with only 
one or two words, saying he was intellectually generous, respectfully 
curious, analytical, prudent, cerebral, fair, reasonable, gentle, 
engaged, deliberate, considerate, careful, precise, cautious, warm, 
wise, witty, philosophical, insightful, compassionate, kindly, and 
prescient.  Many characterized him as one of Minnesota’s finest 
judges; a judge who understood the value of an accessible and 
coherent body of legal doctrine; who knew the importance of 
judicial restraint; and who, despite his stellar talents, had a sense of 
humility and modesty.  For someone unfamiliar with John Simonett 
and his work, this composite seems like impossible hyperbole.  
Doris Simonett, his spirited and accomplished wife, says John could 
only have shaken his head at such praise.  But lawyers and judges 
who worked with John, and who relied on and applied his 
opinions, staunchly maintain that this list is only a beginning. 
Many of these qualities of mind and heart are richly evident in 
Justice Simonett’s opinions and his reflections on the United States 
and Minnesota Constitutions.  Among Justice Simonett’s writings is 
an article entitled, An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota 
Constitution.2  This article served as the lead-in to a series of articles 
on the re-emergence of the Minnesota Constitution, particularly in 
the area of individual rights.3  The article contains observations on 
both the United States and the Minnesota Constitutions.4  As with 
everything Justice Simonett wrote, it is well worth reading both for 
its fundamental observations and for its enlightening excursions.  
No one opinion or one article sets forth Justice Simonett’s full 
thoughts on constitutions.  So our efforts to describe his 
“constitutional wisdom” must necessarily be drawn from partial 
analyses, comments, holdings, concurrences and dissents, or, to use 
a word Justice Simonett chose in other circumstances, “excursions.”  
In this Tribute, Dean Robert Stein describes Justice Simonett’s 
approach to the relationship between the United States 
Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution, and Randall Tietjen 
provides a statistical and methodological look at Justice Simonett’s 
decision making. 
 
 2.  John E. Simonett, An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota Constitution, 20 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 227 (1994). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  See id. (discussing the re-emergence of state constitutions generally and 
identifying considerations for interpreting and applying the Minnesota 
Constitution). 
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss3/8
  
762 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:3 
By way of overview, I want to comment on three underlying 
themes or functional approaches that I discern in Justice 
Simonett’s constitutional jurisprudence.  A broad word, 
jurisprudence, but by that I mean to include his comments and 
observations in briefs submitted to the supreme court when he was 
a practicing attorney; his opinions, concurrences, and dissents 
while he was on the court; and his reflective writings throughout 
his professional career. 
The three recurrent themes or approaches are, first, the 
overarching importance of the doctrine of tripartite separation of 
powers; second, his strong adherence to the principle that 
constitutions should be applied with a considerable degree of 
caution and only when necessary; and third, his strongly held 
opinion that in developing the state constitution, “the court should 
proceed prudently, fashioning its own analytical formula when 
feasible, . . . not allowing rhetoric to outdistance facts,” and 
creating a “distinctive, principled and credible body of state 
constitutional doctrine.”5 
A few examples on each of these themes or approaches 
illustrate his integrated framework on constitutional interpretation.  
First, from his earliest writings as an appellate adversary, he 
anchored his constitutional philosophy in what he considered “the 
great distinguishing characteristic of American constitutional 
government”: the “doctrine of tripartite separation” of powers.6  In 
obtaining a unanimous reversal of a district court’s decision 
upholding the State Board of Education’s order to withhold state 
aid, he upbraided the Board for usurping “the judicial power of 
judgment and the legislative power of creating a penalty.”7  The 
doctrine of separation of powers was the “hard sense and essence”8 
of the issue, and no amount of “[p]atriotic generalizations and 
loose talk” was acceptable “as an excuse for an executive usurpation 
of power.”9  In spirited argument he reminded the court that it is 
its function to guard against this behavior.  He concluded that the 
long and short of it is that “[t]here is no need to belabor the 
obvious—that such philosophy [of ignoring the separation of 
 
 5.  Id. at 242–44. 
 6.  Brief for Appellant at 9, State ex rel. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 6, Morrison 
Cnty. v. Johnson, 242 Minn. 539, 65 N.W.2d 668 (1954) (No. 36140). 
 7.  Id. at 22. 
 8.  Id. at 10. 
 9.  Id. at 12. 
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powers] is one of anarchy. . . .  [It] is the negation of government 
by law.”10 
Although not quite so adamantly phrased as in his appellate 
advocacy, the primacy of the separation of powers doctrine 
remained a central tenet in Justice Simonett’s decision making.  In 
State v. Merrill, he asserted the importance of the court 
remembering its role in the balance equation: “[T]he role of the 
judiciary is limited to deciding whether a statute is constitutional, 
not whether it is wise or prudent legislation.  We do not sit as 
legislators with a veto vote, but as judges deciding whether the 
legislation, presumably constitutional, is so.”11  His allegiance to this 
principle was based not only on the fundamental authority of the 
state and federal constitutions, but also on a recognition of the 
institutional competencies of each branch and the inherent value 
of keeping the power equation balanced.  This is evidenced by the 
cautionary language in his dissent in Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 
addressing the inequality of treatment between victims of accidents 
involving 3.2 beer sales and sales of more potent intoxicating 
liquor: “I would prefer we not disturb the Act until the legislature 
has had an opportunity to enact its own corrective measures.  This 
seems preferable to piecemeal judicial legislation.”12  And further, 
in State v. Olson, in which the court was asked to determine whether 
“brain death” equated to “death” as the term was used in criminal 
statutes,13 Justice Simonett, writing for the court, said: 
       In this instance, where the case before us does not 
require that we act, where the issue raised is of profound 
human interest, prudence dictates, we think, that the 
legislature should first be given an opportunity to 
consider the legal implications of brain death.  The 
legislature, with its broad based representation, its 
committee hearings, and its floor debates, presents the 
kind of public forum this issue deserves.14 
The second theme that Justice Simonett adhered to is the 
principle that “constitutions should be applied with caution, and 
only when necessary.”15  He observed in An Introduction to Essays on 
the Minnesota Constitution that constitutional law concerns itself with 
 
 10.  Id. at 11–12. 
 11.  450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. 1990) (citations omitted). 
 12.  309 N.W.2d 273, 285 (Minn. 1981) (Simonett, J., dissenting). 
 13.  435 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Minn. 1989).   
 14.  Id. at 535 (footnote omitted). 
 15.  Simonett, supra note 2, at 231 (footnotes omitted). 
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enduring and broadly stated principles and that many narrower 
issues are better resolved by application of statutory law or 
incremental development of the common law.16  He noted with 
approval that the supreme court had recently declined “to rule that 
the ‘cruel or unusual’ clause of the Minnesota Constitution 
guarantees proportionality in criminal [sentencing].”17  For the 
court to do otherwise would essentially “constitutionalize the 
sentencing guidelines.”18 
He gave meaning to this cautionary approach in his succinct 
concurrence in State v. French.19  In that case, which involved an 
issue arising under the Minnesota Human Rights Act that related to 
unmarried cohabitation in rental property and the violation of the 
landlord’s right to the exercise of religion under the freedom of 
conscience provision of the Minnesota Constitution, Justice 
Simonett stated simply: “Because the issue of statutory construction 
is dispositive here, I do not reach the constitutional questions.”20 
Similarly, in Bolin v. State, which dealt with an equal protection 
challenge by a state trooper who wanted to run for public office, 
Justice Simonett, in a dissent joined by others, said, “While it may 
be unnecessarily harsh to require a trooper to pay his own moving 
expenses to a new post, this item does not rise to the stature of a 
constitutional infirmity.”21 
The third underlying theme or functional approach relates to 
the interweaving of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions 
as the court developed the state constitutional provisions.  Justice 
Simonett was particularly mindful of the process that the court 
would employ in determining which constitution to use, the order 
in which the constitutions would be applied, and the methodology 
of the application.22  In An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota 
Constitution, he pointed to two recent cases, State v. Hershberger23 and 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,24 in which the Minnesota Supreme Court 
had initially declared a law to be unconstitutional under the 
Federal Constitution only to have the United States Supreme Court 
 
 16.  See id. at 230. 
 17.  Id. at 232. 
 18.  Id. (quoting State v. Stirens, 506 N.W.2d 302, 305 (Minn. 1993)). 
 19.  460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (Simonett, J., concurring). 
 20.  Id. at 11. 
 21.  313 N.W.2d 381, 387 (Minn. 1981) (Simonett, J., dissenting). 
 22.  Simonett, supra note 2, at 234. 
 23.  444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989), vacated, 495 U.S. 901 (1990). 
 24.  457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), rev’d, 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
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disagree and remand for further consideration.25  In Hershberger II, 
the court decided to apply the Minnesota Constitution’s liberty of 
conscience provision to again find the law unconstitutional,26 
whereas in Cohen II, the court declined to extend the protection of 
the free press clause beyond the federal protection.27 
Justice Simonett expressed concern that 
the court should proceed prudently, fashioning its own 
analytical formula when feasible, and not allowing 
rhetoric to outdistance facts.  Care should be taken in 
creating precedent because any precedent in 
constitutional law is perceived by the public to partake of 
the enduring and fundamental character of the 
constitution itself.  And, finally, constitutional law and 
common law should be kept separate . . . .28 
These considerations surfaced in his concurrence in 
Hershberger II, when he wrote: “I join the court’s opinion.  Because 
this is the first occasion where our court has considered its liberty 
of conscience clause in any detail, aside from the plurality opinion 
in State v. French . . . , I should like to add an observation or two.”29  
And in State v. Russell, he similarly wrote, 
       As this court develops an equal protection analysis 
under the state constitution, I find it important to develop 
our analysis in a principled manner, understandable to 
the legislature, the bar, and the courts.  Because I share 
the dissent’s concern that the court’s opinion may be 
misconstrued as opening the door to substantive due 
process, I feel I should write.30 
These three approaches or principles are congruent with 
Justice Simonett’s intellectual qualities: analytical, careful, precise, 
and cautious in building a sturdy architecture of thought on the 
court’s approach to constitutional questions.  These approaches 
are also in harmony with his personal judicial philosophy that is 
reflected in all of his opinions: a strong commitment to building an 
 
 25.  Simonett, supra note 2, at 237. 
 26.  State v. Hershberger (Hershberger II), 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) 
(holding that application of a statute requiring display of a slow-moving vehicle 
emblem to Amish defendants violated their freedom of conscience rights 
protected by the Minnesota Constitution). 
 27.  Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (Cohen II), 479 N.W.2d 387, 390–91 (Minn. 
1992). 
 28.  Simonett, supra note 2, at 242–43. 
 29.  Hershberger II, 462 N.W.2d at 399 (citation omitted). 
 30.  477 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1991) (Simonett, J., concurring specially). 
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accessible and coherent body of legal doctrine, a careful attention 
to getting the law straight and making it work, and solidly mooring 
each constitutional decision within the proper boundaries of a 
tripartite balance of power. 
And, finally, it is important to comment not only on what 
Justice Simonett did as a judge, but also the way in which he did it.  
His opinions, concurrences, and dissents have been heralded for 
the careful and thoughtful guidance that he provided to the district 
courts, the court of appeals, his colleagues on the supreme court, 
and to the practicing bar.  He had a gift for not only reaching a 
carefully thought-through result, but walking us through the entire 
resolution to see how he got there.  He did precisely what our 
children’s second-grade math teachers repeatedly admonished 
them to do: he showed his work.  We came to understand what 
approaches he considered, which he pursued, which he rejected, 
and why he chose or rejected them.  He provided guidance on 
what the jury instructions should be when the remanded case went 
back for trial.  He showed us what the architecture should be going 
forward.  Without ever putting a thumb on the scale of fact-finding, 
he would get the decision-making structure back on track and 
redirected in a way that would cure a disproportionate 
development in the law.  He had the capacity to put doctrines, 
theories, and legal tenets where they belonged and to keep them 
there.  He greatly respected the ingenuity and the creativity of 
lawyers, but he knew that it fell to the judiciary to keep the overall 
structure, particularly the common law, in proper shape and 
working to accomplish principled ends. 
He did this with the utmost respect to the litigants, the lawyers, 
his colleagues on the supreme court, and his colleagues on the 
district courts and the court of appeals.  He spent no time in a 
hierarchical posture admonishing “lower courts.”  He did not 
gratuitously disparage other reasoning processes.  He created an 
atmosphere of shared inquiry and the combined search for the best 
answer.  Although he was always clear in his own analyses, he 
recognized varying paths that could lead to the same result and 
accepted robust discussion and individual differences as a hallmark 
of the American tradition and a valuable tradition in American law.  
He often referred to James Bryce’s observation about America that 
there was no country in the world that more fully applied Frederick 
the Great’s principle “that everyone should be allowed to go to 
7
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heaven in his own way.”31  Justice Simonett embodied that spirit.  
His warm humanity showed a visceral understanding and 
acceptance of the human condition with all of its challenges, 
foibles, and aspirations. 
I have always believed that in the end, it is the caliber, the 
performance, and the character of the individual judges that 
determine the reputation and the worthiness of a court.  So I 
consider myself very lucky to have begun practicing law in the 
1970s when the Minnesota Supreme Court included Justices Walter 
Rogosheske, Bob Sheran, Jim Otis, and Rosalie Wahl, joined in the 
early ‘80s by Jeanne Coyne, Doug Amdahl, and John Simonett.  
Justice Simonett was one of that great array of giants—the 
Minnesota version of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, or a blend of 
Holmes and Garrison Keillor: a walking version of down-home 
common law for which he gladly accepted stewardship.  This 
stewardship for the development and the maintenance of the law 
was his legacy, and we in Minnesota have been the lucky recipients 
of his work.  He often quoted the observation that Justice Holmes 
anchored in the first paragraph of his famous book, The Common 
Law, that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience.”32  But John Simonett seemed to have bridged that gap 
with a genius for successfully melding logic and experience in a 
workable structure.  He believed that “[e]ach new generation of 
citizens must be taught the meaning of the judicial process, how it 
works, its justification, and its limits.”33  And “[t]he process insists 
on a distinctive, principled and credible body of state constitutional 
doctrine.”34  Justice Simonett has provided us with invaluable tools 
and materials to understand and protect state and federal 
constitutional doctrine and to carry on these teachings. 
 
 
 31.  E.g., Hershberger II, 462 N.W.2d at 399 n.2 (Simonett, J., concurring) 
(quoting 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 680 (1891)). 
 32.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe 
ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881). 
 33.  Simonett, supra note 2, at 243. 
 34.  Id. at 244. 
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